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INTERNAL AFFAIRS RULE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS-
THE ERIE PROBLEM
One of the many problems posed by the pervasive doctrine of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins:1 is whether a federal court must apply a state
rule of law which dictates that the state courts will not adjudicate a
case involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.' The
status of the internal affairs rule on the state level 3 presently varies
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, ranging from automatic dismissal 4
to a more flexible application which employs standards resembling
those of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 5 On the federal level,
however, the relationship between the internal affairs rule and forum
1304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2The "internal affairs rule" has been thus defined by the Supreme Court:
[A] court-state or federal-sitting in one State will as a general rule decline
to interfere with or control by injunction or otherwise the management of the
internal affairs of a corporation organized under the laws of another State
but will leave controversies as to such matters to the courts of the state of
the domicile.
Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933).
Considerable difficulty has been encountered in attempting to determine what affects
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, and what does not. The most widely
accepted definition was given by the Maryland supreme court:
[W]here the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity
as a member of the corporation whether it be as stockholder, director, presi-
dent, or other officer, and is the act of the corporation, whether acting in
stockholders' meeting, or through its agents, the board of directors, . . . then
such action is the management of the internal affairs of the corporation, and
in case of a foreign corporation, our Courts will not take jurisdiction.
North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field, 64 Md. 151, 154, 20 AtI. 1039,
1040 (1885). Mr. Justice Cardozo, in Travis v. Knox Terpezone Co., 215 N.Y. 259,
109 N.E. 250 (1915), termed such an attempted definition a "difficult and hazardous
venture." Id. at 264, 109 N.E. at 251. See also Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 91
N.E. 683 (1910); Note, 46 CoLum. L. REv. 413, 423 n.57 (1946); Note, 33 CoLum.
L. Rxv. 492 n.1 (1933).
43The historical development of the rule in the state courts will not be discussed in
this Comment. For an excellent treatment of the topic, see Note, The "Internal Affair.?
Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 666 (1949). For a general survey of
the rule on both state and federal levels, see 17 FLrEcER, PRiVATE CoRPoRArIoNs
§§ 8425-45.1 (1959). The internal affairs decisions of the Supreme Court in 1933,
1946 and 1947, see text accompanying notes 6-21 infra, evoked considerable comment,
much of which extensively summarized the development of the internal affairs rule
up to the respective publication dates. See generally, Braucher, The Inconvenient
Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. Ry. 908 (1947) ; Note, Forum Non Conveniens-A New
Federal Doctrine, 56 YATE L.J. 1234, 1243 (1947) (Asserts that forum non con-
veniens has been "expressly substituted" for the internal affairs rule in many cir-
cumstances. The title of the article illustrates the fact that the forum non conveniens
doctrine developed much later than the internal affairs rule-and, as the text indicates,
literally overtook it.); Note, 46 CoLum. L. REv. 413 (1946); Note, 33 CoLum. L.
REv. 492 (1933).
4 See, e.g., Wojtczak v. American United Life Ins. Co., 293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W.
364 (1940) ; O'Hara v. Frenkil, 155 Md. 189, 193, 141 Atl. 528, 530 (1928).
6 See, e.g., Sharp v. Big Jim Mines, 39 Cal. App. 2d 435, 439, 103 P.2d 430, 433
(1940) ; Cohn v. Mishkoff Costello Co., 256 N.Y. 102, 105, 175 N.E. 529, 530 (1931).
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non conveniens has been established by three Supreme Court decisions.
In each case, jurisdiction was based upon diversity of citizenship.
These decisions effected a transition in the internal affairs rule, from
one requiring automatic dismissal to one subsumed under the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.
In the first case, Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,' plaintiff alleged
that certain officers of a foreign corporation had wrongfully diverted
assets to their own use. The Supreme Court held that the facts of the
case brought it within the purview of the internal affairs rule,' and
justified the exercise of the district court's discretion in dismissing
the action.' While the opinion did not explicitly mention forum non
conveniens,9 it did question the application of a hard and fast rule in
all cases, and asserted that in the exercise of "sound discretion" courts
should apply the "considerations of convenience, efficiency and
justice." "o
The second internal affairs case before the Court-Williams v.
Green Bay & W. R.R."1--was a suit to recover amounts allegedly due
on debentures which had been issued by the company with no fixed rate
of interest. The district court, citing Rogers, granted the defendant's
motion for dismissal on the basis of the internal affairs rule.'2 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.'" In reversing the
dismissal and remanding the case to be tried on the merits, the Supreme
Court explicitly recognized that it was deciding a forum non con-
veniens question.' 4 The Court stated that jurisdiction should not be
declined merely because the case involves complicated affairs of a
foreign corporation,' 5 and that dismissal might be granted only upon
a showing that maintenance of a suit away from the domicile of the
defendant would be vexatious or oppressive."f The Court, however,
explicitly reserved decision on the question whether it was obliged by
6288 U.S. 123 (1933).
71d. at 132-33.
8The result reached in this case has been criticized in 1A MooRF, FEDEAL
PRACtiCE 110.204, n.18 (2d ed. 1965); Comment, 31 Mic-. L. REv. 682, 694 (1933).
9 Forum non conveniens was mentioned only by Mr. Justice Cardozo, in his dissent,
in the now famous line: "The doctrine of forum non conveniens is an instrument of
justice." 288 U.S. at 151.
'Old. at 131.
11326 U.S. 549 (1946).
1259 F. Supp. 98, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). The district court also cited a New
York case, Cohn v. Mishkoff Costello Co., 256 N.Y. 102, 105, 175 N.E. 529, 530
(1931), which had dismissed a similar complaint 59 F. Supp. 100.
13 147 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit in dismissing the case spoke
in terms of forum non conveniens; the Supreme Court retained the forum non con-
veniens characterization, even though it decided that the case should not be dismssed.
-4 326 U.S. at 554.
15 1d. at 556-57.
6 Id. at 554.
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Erie to follow the New York rule17 since the state law dictated the
same result that it had reached.'8
The third case, Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.,'" estab-
lished that the internal affairs rule at the federal level was to be treated
as a part of the federal forum non conveniens doctrine. Koster was a
stockholder's derivative action brought against an Illinois corporation
and its president in a New York court. Plaintiff requested an account-
ing for money which the president had allegedly diverted from corpo-
rate funds through breach of trust. The Supreme Court affirmed a
dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff's choice of forum was
clearly inconvenient to the defendant, and was not justified by any
corresponding benefit to the plaintiff. Every source of evidence neces-
sary to the plaintiff's case, the Court noted, was to be found in Illinois. °
The Court made clear that dismissal was not an automatic corollary
of the fact that the case involved the internal affairs of a foreign corpo-
ration. Rather, internal affairs became "one, but only one" factor
to be taken into consideration in determining the appropriateness of
a forum.2'
These decisions laid down guidelines for the lower federal courts
to follow in determining when dismissal of a case involving the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation would be appropriate.22 Under the
forum non conveniens doctrine, the court must balance any vexatious-
ness or oppressiveness to the defendant against those practical considera-
tions which may prevent the plaintiff from maintaining his action else-
where.2 In effect, then, these decisions reduced the possibility that a
1
7 The New York State rule has been characterized as an exercise of the state
forum non conveniens doctrine rather than as a rule requiring a dismissal in every
case. See Note, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 34 VA. L. REv. 811, 816
& n.44 (1948). It would thus seem to be a "flexible" rule, applying forum non con-
veniens criteria similar to those laid down by the Supreme Court. But see, Harris
v. Weiss Eng'r Corp., 267 App. Div. 96, 44 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1943).
Is 326 U.S. at 559.
19 330 U.S. 518 (1947).
20o Id. at 526.
21 There is no rule of law, moreover, which requires dismissal of a suitor from
the forum on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues that relate to
the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. That is one, It only one,
factor which may show convenience of parties or witnesses, the appropriate-
ness of trial in a forum familiar with the law of the corporation's domicile,
and the enforceability of the remedy if one be granted. But the ultimate
inquiry is where trial will best serve the convenience of the parties and the
ends of justice.
Id. at 527. (Emphasis added.)
2 2 But see, Ellsworth v. Carr-Consol. Biscuit Co., 90 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Pa.
1950). Dismissal without prejudice has been the traditional result of the application
of forum non conveniens. One year after Koster, however, federal courts were given
the power, by the passage of § 1404(a) of the Judicial Code, to transfer a case rather
than dismiss it. 28 U.S.C. §1404(a) (1964). Section 1404(a) provides: "For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may
transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been
brought" See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
23 Even before the enactment of § 1404(a), the common law doctrine of forum
non conveniens presupposed the existence of two forums in which both jurisdiction
and venue were proper. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 506-07 (1947).
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large corporation or its officers would be able to use the internal affairs
rule as a wall behind which to hide from a plaintiff with a justiciable
claim.24
As noted earlier, one question expressly reserved by the Supreme
Court in the Williams case was whether the federal court should apply
these forum non conveniens standards in all cases, or whether Erie
required that, in some cases, state law be followed. 5 If the state rule
and the federal standards dictate the same result, there is, of course,
no problem."6 But what of a situation where the result obtainable in
state court is different from that which would be reached by applica-
tion of forum non conveniens? This situation would arise either
where the state rule is inflexible, or where it is flexible but, would,
in some cases, yield a different result from the federal rule."
The traditional doctrine has been that if a state rule has an articu-
lated state policy behind it, the rule will be substantive for Erie pur-
poses, and thus binding on the federal courts. The Supreme Court
has looked to whether the policy behind the state rule would be frus-
trated by allowing suit in federal court. For example, in Angel v.
Bullington,5 a Virginia citizen brought suit in a North Carolina state
court seeking a deficiency judgment against a North Carolina citizen.
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that a state statute deprived
its courts of jurisdiction to give deficiency judgments. The plaintiff
then brought a new suit in the federal district court in North Carolina,
This restriction on the operation of forum non conveniens was carried over into
§ 1404(a). In Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960), the Supreme Court held that
transfer under § 1404(a) was not possible if the defendant were not subject to service
of process in the transferee forum, even if he were willing to waive such defense.
Moreover, a court can consider dismissal only where two forums are available in
which suit can be brought.
24 When a plaintiff names individual officers or directors of a corporation as
parties defendant (to obtain a decree enjoining or ordering some action in an official
capacity), the facts of the case may reveal that some or all of the individual defendants
are not subject to service in the state of corporate domicile. See, e.g., Lapides v.
Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Crandall v. Canole, 230 F. Supp. 705
(E.D. Pa. 1964); Ellsworth v. Carr-Consol. Biscuit Co., 90 F. Supp. 586 (M.D. Pa.
1950); Hall v. American Cone & Pretzel Co., 71 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
Thus dismissal under the internal affairs rule may mean that the plaintiff's case may
never be heard on the merits.
25Even though the Court had before it the decision of judge Learned Hand in
Weiss v. Routh, 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945) (see notes 44-45 infra and accompanying
text), which held that the federal court was bound under Erie to follow the state
rule, the Court explicitly reserved decision on that question. Williams v. Green Bay
& W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549, 558 (1946). Because the Court refused to sanction the
Weiss decision, but rather laid down guidelines for independent federal action, it has
been suggested that the Supreme Court implicitly disapproved of the Weiss result.
Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 890-91 (E.D. Mich. 1965); Hall v. American
Cone & Pretzel Co., 71 F. Supp. 266, 269 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
26 The Supreme Court found such to be the case in Williams v. Green Bay &
W.R.R., supra note 25, at 559. The Court decided that it did not have to pass upon
the question whether Erie compelled the application of state law, since "even if we
assume the New York rule to be applicable here, we would reach no different result."
Ibid.
2 7 See text accompanying note 33 infra.
28 330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, and seeking the same
relief against the same defendant on the same claim. The federal
district court granted relief, but was reversed by the Supreme Court.
It was there held that the North Carolina statute was expressive of
a state policy against deficiency judgments and that to allow such a
suit to be maintained in a federal court would defeat this policy.2"
One of the reasons given for the internal affairs rule during the
early stages of its development was the existence of a state policy to
protect foreign corporations from vexatious litigation in forums distant
from the state of domicile.30 This may reflect a state policy of en-
couraging foreign corporations to come into the state and transact
their business there by guaranteeing that they will be free from vexa-
tious internal affairs litigation. If it is apparent to the federal court
that such a state policy would be frustrated were the federal court
to disregard the state rule, then the federal court would be bound under
Erie to apply it.31
Should, however, a federal court not find an articulated state
policy for the state internal affairs rule, it does not invariably follow
that the state rule may be disregarded. A further inquiry must be
made into the character of the state rule. If, on the one hand, the
state rule is flexible, admitting of refinements and exceptions that
approach forum non conveniens criteria, a federal court should not
infer that a state policy exists which must be effectuated in federal
court. While it is possible that a state policy may exist even for a
flexible internal affairs rule, it would not be of such a kind as to dictate
that the federal court follow the state rule. A state policy of fairness
or convenience to the parties would be protected equally as well by
federal standards.
If, on the other hand, the state has an inflexible internal affairs
rule which invariably dictates dismissal, a federal court should infer
the existence of a substantive state policy which the federal court is
bound to protect. The existence of such an inflexible rule indicates
an attempt by the state to affect the pre-trial activity of the parties,
and is thus substantive for Erie purposes.32
29 1d. at 191. Similarly, in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949),
the Supreme Court held that a Tennessee corporation could not sue in the federal
district court in Mississippi when a state statute did not permit an unregistered foreign
corporation to bring suit in state courts. The state policy behind the statute was
to encourage foreign corporations to register an agent for service of process within
the state. Cf. Szantay v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 349 F.Zd 60, 66 (4th Cir. 1965).
30 See Grismer v. Merger Mines Corp., 43 F. Supp. 990, 993 (E.D. Wash. 1942),
modified 137 F.2d 335 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 794 (1943) ; Lind v. Johnson,
183 Minn. 239, 241, 236 N.W. 317, 318 (1931) ; Beard v. Beard, 66 Ore. 512, 518, 133
Pac. 797, 799, rehearing denied, 66 Ore. 512, 134 Pac. 1196 (1913).
31 The fact that in Angel and Woods state statutes were involved does not mean
that these cases are distinguishable, since the express purpose of Erie was to bind
federal courts by state judge-made decisional law as well as by state statutes.
2 .Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J. concurring). It
may be possible, however, that there would be federal countervailing considerations
1967]
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In those cases in which the state standards are flexible but the
criteria the state court would apply differ from those a federal court
would apply in similar circumstances, a further analysis is required.
One case envisioned occurs when the state court would retain juris-
diction if the issue involves, for example, allegations of fraud, and
would dismiss all other cases categorically. A federal court, in similar
circumstances, would look to considerations such as the accessibility
of corporate records or the extent of business transacted within the
forum state, deciding, in a balance, what are the dictates of "fairness."
In such a case the state law may be regarded as inflexible in all cases
which would be categorically dismissed under state law, and, as noted
above 33 the federal court should infer the existence of a state substan-
tive policy behind the inflexible rule. On the other hand, in those
cases in which the state and the federal courts would reach different
results because, in balancing, the courts disagree as to the weight that
should be given to certain factors in deciding what is "fair," no evidence
of a state substantive policy is found. Such a difference in result
between the state and federal court can be attributed only to the
abstract and often subjective evaluations of what is in the best
interests of "justice and expedience." In short, two applications of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens are at work, each motivated
by the same goal, but implemented by judicial discretion that em-
phasizes different elements. Consequently, a federal court should
be free to apply its own standards since the mandate of Erie does not
extend to the convenience of courts or parties. This result is in
accord with a growing body of case law indicating that federal courts
are not bound by Erie to apply state forum non conveniens criteria. 4
The above analysis, based on the flexible-inflexible dichotomy,
corresponds with the result that would be reached under Hanna v.
Plumer,5 the most recent of the landmark decisions construing Erie.
The question before the Supreme Court in Hanna was whether state
which would outweigh the state policy and dictate independent federal action. In
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the question before the
Court was the effect to be given to a state judge-made rule allocating the trial of a
particular fact to the judge rather than a jury. The Supreme Court observed that
there were "affirmative countervailing considerations at work" id. at 537, i.e., the
federal practice of allocating the function of determining such issues to the jury.
It was held that the operative Erie policies were outweighed by the countervailing
federal considerations, and that the federal practice should govern. It is possible
that such federal considerations may be found in the federal venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1401, or the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Cf. 50 MARQ. L. RWv.
405, 409 (1966). Moreover, the federal forum may be the only one in which the suit
may be maintained because the defendants are not subject to service of process else-
where. Such was the case in Lapides v. Doner, 248 F. Supp. 883, 896 (E.D. Mich.
1965). See notes 41-49 infra and accompanying text. See also Hall v. American
Cone & Pretzel Co., 71 F. Supp. 266, 268 (E.D. Pa. 1947). If such is the case, the
general purpose of federal diversity jurisdiction-to provide a forum where a justiciable
claim may be heard-may provide a sufficient federal interest to override state policies.
33 See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
34 See note 57 infra.
35 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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or federal law controlled the manner of service of process in a federal
district court. The plaintiff had complied with Rule 4(d) (1) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits service at the dwelling
house of the defendant, but he had not fulfilled the requirements of
a Massachusetts statute requiring either personal in-hand service upon
an executor of an estate or posting of notice at the courthouse. Ad-
dressing himself squarely to the conflict, Chief Justice Warren noted
"that choices between state and federal law are to be made not by
application of any automatic "litmus paper" criterion," but rather by
reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule." " The majority
found these policies to be twofold. First, Erie was designed to prevent
possible discrimination against in-state plaintiffs who would be de-
prived of access to federal courts-and a more favorable result-by the
requirements of diversity jurisdiction." Second, Erie was intended
to correct the vice of forum shopping which had grown up in response
to the rule of Swift v. Tyson 9 Failing to find either of these policies
frustrated by application of 4(d) (1) in this case, the Court held that
the federal rule governed.4o
Thus it is clear from the Court's opinion in Hanna that the federal
courts must apply the state rule if disregarding it would frustrate the
underlying policies of Erie. But federal courts which have held that
they were not obligated by Erie to follow the state internal affairs
rule have failed to examine these policy reasons. In one such recent
case, Lapides v. Doner,4' a stockholder of an Ohio corporation brought
a derivative action in a federal court in Michigan for a declaration
that a meeting of the board of directors and the resolutions adopted
36The Court was referring to the "outcome determinative" test of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). In that case the Court had held that where
a state statute of limitations barred recovery in a state court, a federal district court
was likewise precluded from granting relief. The "outcome" test was stated by
Mr. Justice Frankfurter: "The question is . . . does it significantly affect the result of
a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling
in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?" Id. at 109.
The Supreme Court in Hanna, viewing York, within the perspective of the dual
policy aims of Erie, stated that "'Outcome-determination' analysis was never intended
to serve as a talisman." 380 U.S. at 466-67.
37 380 U.S. at 467.
38 Article III of the Constitution contains the grant of diversity jurisdiction to
ensure equality of treatment for both residents and nonresidents. U.S. CoNsT. art. III,
2; see Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
While it is true that an in-state plaintiff could bring an action against a "foreign"
corporation in a federal court basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship, joinder
of corporate officials resident within the plaintiff's home state may negate this possi-
bility. Suits naming individual officers or directors whose residence may destroy
diversity are not uncommon. See note 24 mtpra.
39 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965).
40 380 U.S. at 465-69. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan framed the
issue in slightly more traditional terms:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to apply a
state or a federal rule, whether "substantive" or "procedural," is to stay close
to basic principles by inquiring if the choice of rule would substantially affect
those primary decisions respecting human conduct which our constitutional
system leaves to state regulation. Id. at 475.
41248 F. Supp. 883 (E.D. Mich. 1965). See also, Hall v. American Cone &
Pretzel Co., 71 F. Supp. 266 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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at that meeting were null and void. The Michigan Supreme Court
had long before held, in Wojtczak v. American United Life Ins. Co.,
42
that Michigan courts would not assume jurisdiction in matters which
involved the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The language
used by the Michigan court in Wojtczak was a statement of the rule
in its most intransigent form, admitting of no forum non conveniens
considerations.
The primary issue before the court in Lapides was whether the
rule of law in Michigan, as announced in Wojtczak, should control.
48
In deciding that question, the court considered at length the opinion by
Judge Learned Hand in Weiss v. Routh,44 the first case to consider
whether Erie dictated the application of a state internal affairs rule.
The Second Circuit had held in Weiss that the state rule must govern
for two reasons: first, an in-state plaintiff would be restricted by
diversity requirements to the state court and perhaps a different
outcome; second, unless the court followed state law, the decision in
each case would not appear to be controlled by a set principle, but
rather by the whim of the judge.45
In declining to follow Weiss, the court in Lapides stated first,
that the "outcome determinative" test had been "discredited" by the
Supreme Court's decision in Hanna.4 6 Second, the court observed that
the principles which Judge Hand had found lacking in Weiss were
supplied one year later by the Supreme Court in Williams v. Green Bay
& W. R. R. 4 7
After rejecting Weiss, the court in Lapides discussed the forum
non conveniens treatment of the internal affairs rule in Williams and
Koster. But the court failed to consider that when the Supreme Court
in Williams held that the lower court should have retained jurisdiction,
it noted that the state internal affairs rule would have dictated the
same result. 4' The state law in that case was not, therefore, the
inflexible type of internal affairs rule found in Michigan.
49
42293 Mich. 449, 292 N.W. 364 (1940).
48 248 F. Supp. at 888.
44 149 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1945).
45 Id. at 195.
46 248 F. Supp. at 888. See note 36 supra.
47 248 F. Supp. at 888-91. See note 25 supra. In support of its holding, the court
in Lapides also asserted that matters governed by federal statutes were exempt from
the operation of the Erie doctrine, and that since questions of forum non conveniens
in the federal courts are now governed by § 1404(a), Erie does not require the federal
courts to follow the state forum non conveniens law. Id. at 892. There is now a
growing body of case law outside the internal affairs area supporting this assertion.
See note 57 infra. The difficulty with this reasoning as applied to the internal affairs
situation is that it assumes that the standards enunciated in § 1404(a) were intended
to govern even where there is a substantive policy behind the state rule. Such an
assumption is unwarranted.
48 See note 26 mtpra.
49 Despite the fact that the court in Lapides found "that the Court in Wojtczak
declined jurisdiction without regard to the convenience of the forum for the parties
concerned," 248 F. Supp. at 886, it nevertheless attempted to characterize the Michigan
state rule as one of forum non conveniens by analyzing language of the court in
Wojtczak quoted from Fletcher, Private Corporations. Ibid.
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Had the Lapides court considered the two-pronged test formulated
in Hanna v. Plummer, rather than just noting that Hanna discredited
the "outcome determinative" test, it could not have reached the result
that it did. Since Michigan had developed an inflexible internal affairs
rule, allowing the federal court to hear the case under the Supreme
Court's forum non conveniens standards encourages future plaintiffs to
choose the federal rather than the state forum. Moreover, an in-state
plaintiff would be barred by diversity requirements from the federal
courts under the factual situation in Lapides."° The Lapides result,
therefore, would seem to contravene the two-fold Erie policies pointed
out by Hanna: avoidance of forum shopping and discrimination against
in-state plaintiffs.5
Thus if the state in which the federal court sits has an inflexible
internal affairs rule, Hanna would dictate that the state rule be fol-
lowed. However, even in following the state rule, a federal court has
an option available to it which is not available to a state court. Under
the provisions of section 1404(a) of the Judicial Code,"2 a federal
district court is authorized to transfer an action to a more convenient
forum rather than dismiss it. 3 Transfer of the suit rather than dis-
missal would not frustrate any state policy underlying the rule since
the state policy provides only that the case is not to be heard within
the state."4
C0The plaintiff in Lapides had joined as individual defendants corporate officers
who, the court noted, lived in Michigan. 248 F. Supp. at 896. See note 38 supra.
61 In the words of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion, if permitting the federal
court to disregard the state rule would thus "affect those primary decisions respecting
human conduct," the state internal affairs rule should be deemed substantive for Erie
purposes and binding on the federal court. See note 40 supra.
One possible justification for the result in Lapides is that the Michigan Supreme
Court might not today assume the same intransigent position as it did twenty-five
years ago in Wojtczak. However, such speculation seems to be unwarranted in the
absence of any indication that the Michigan courts have had a change of heart.
52 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). See note 22 supra.
S3 Such a transfer would, however, be subject to the jurisdictional restrictions
of Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960). See note 23 supra. To allow such a
transfer would relieve the plaintiff of all the "harsh results" of dismissal: the run-
ning of the statute of limitations; dissolving of temporary injunctions; attachments;
garnishments; new service of process problems. Cf. MooR, F-nERAL PRACrCE,
1 0.204, at 2205 (2d ed. 1965).
54 Such a transfer would, however, pose difficult-albeit interesting-conflict of
laws problems for the transferee forum. The Supreme Court's decision in Van
Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964), which held that the law which the transferor
forum would have applied would govern in the new forum, was limited by the Court
to the facts in that case. Id. at 639. The Court also stated, "We do not attempt to
determine whether . . . the same considerations would govern if a plaintiff sought
transfer under § 1404(a) or if it was contended that the transferor State would simply
have dismissed the action on the ground of forum non conveniens." Id. at 640. See
Note, Erie, Forum Non Con'veoiens and Choice of Law in Diversity Cases, 53 VA.
L. Rzy. 380, 389 (1967).
Moreover, there may be a question whether the original forum would have applied
its own law or the law of the corporate domicile had it heard the case on the merits.
The liability of a corporate officer for an act done by him in his official capacity is
usually determined by the laws of the incorporating state. See RESTATaMENT, CoN-
FLicr oF LAws §§ 187-88 (1934). It has been suggested, however, upon the application
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When, however, the federal court sits in a state which has a
flexible internal affairs rule, but the state standards for retention or
dismissal of a case diverge from those delineated by the Supreme Court,
the Erie-Hannc analysis will give a different result.55 Since in both
state and federal systems there will be latitude for the exercise of
judicial discretion, a different outcome on the federal level will not
be reasonably predictable and can not, therefore, be said to encourage
forum shopping. Nor can it be said beforehand that the plaintiff
will be better off in one forum rather than the other; hence, there
will not be any discrimination against in-state plaintiffs. 6 Absent
these factors of forum shopping or discrimination to in-state plaintiffs,
the state rule should be deemed procedural for Erie purposes, and the
federal court should be free to apply the federal standards in this area. 7
of a weighing of interests theory, that the law of the forum should govern in a suit
by minority stockholders for rescission of sale of stock based on an asserted violation
of the fiduciary relationship between the corporate officers and the minority stock-
holders. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959).
55 Once again, this parallels the pre-Hanna result. See text accompanying note
35 .rupra.
56 Alternately phrased, the difference in outcome resulting from the application
of different standards in state and federal courts could not be said to affect "primary
decisions respecting human conduct." 380 U.S. at 475 (Harlan, J. concurring).
57 There is a growing body of case law, not dealing with internal affairs, which
indicates that federal courts are not bound by Erie to apply state form non con-
veniens laws. See Willis v. Weil Pump Co., 222 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1955); Gilbert
v. Gulf Oil Corp., 153 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1946); Shulman v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 152 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ; Ultra Sucro Co. v. Illinois
Water Treatment Co., 146 F. Supp. 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). If a state has an internal
affairs rule that is not inflexible, then the Hanna-Erie analysis would indicate that
the state rule would be procedural for Erie purposes and not binding on the federal
court. If another forum were available, the state internal affairs rule could then
properly be described as part of a state forum non conveniens doctrine. The resulting
freedom of the federal court to apply its own standards would be consonant with the
development of the law in the general forum non conveniens area.
